24 February, 2017
Original:
"Iran and the South Caucasus: A Struggle For Influence", Journal of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, 2011, Vol 12, Issue 1, 51-62, Stockholm, Sweden.
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Introduction
It is well known that within the dozen centuries the South Caucasus had a strategic importance for superpowers which dominated in different historical periods. As a start of superpowers’ struggle and paramount evidence of their attempts to secure interests in this strategic part of the world, we can recall the Roman Army advances under command of General Pompey (66-65 BC) and General Mark Antony (36 BC) to the Caucasus. And in 75 AD, Roman Emperor Domitian has sent the legion of XII Fulminata to support the allied kingdoms of Iberia and Albania (modern Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively). A rock inscription was found near the shores of the Caspian Sea (Gobustan, 60-70 km from Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan) mentions the presence of Legio XII Fulminata's centurio named Lucius Julius Maximus (1; 2).
The region’s strategic dimensions
The contemporary politics of the South Caucasus is characterized by the high level of complexity as well as dynamic rivalry between global, regional and local players. Concerning to the region’s landscape, one can emphasize that the United States, Islamic world and European countries present global powers; Russia, Turkey and Iran are key regional actors; and finally, as local actors, one can indicate Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. In addition, a huge pool of influenceable international organizations like OSCE, CIS, EU, NATO, OIC and religious and humanitarian organizations operate and shape politics in this part of the world. Meanwhile, the large family of multi-national oil corporations and companies like BP (UK), Amoco (USA), UNOCAL (USA), McDermott International (USA) and others have their own “pie” in the Caucasus tangle web of oil and politics.
Last, the XXI century’s South Caucasus, like a whole Great Caucasus region, continues to be complex and unassimilated by Russians and occupies a strategic importance for global politics, international security and energy security.
Iran, as mentioned above, is one of the key players in the South Caucasus. And, as within the whole course of history, Iran (Persia) continues to be in the list of powers which struggles for their interests and goals in this region. So, the modern Iran has wide and deep historical experience to play its own strategic game in this part of the world.
Key sources of Iran’s foreign policy
It is well known that within the dozen centuries the South Caucasus had a strategic importance for superpowers which dominated in different historical periods. As a start of superpowers’ struggle and paramount evidence of their attempts to secure interests in this strategic part of the world, we can recall the Roman Army advances under command of General Pompey (66-65 BC) and General Mark Antony (36 BC) to the Caucasus. And in 75 AD, Roman Emperor Domitian has sent the legion of XII Fulminata to support the allied kingdoms of Iberia and Albania (modern Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively). A rock inscription was found near the shores of the Caspian Sea (Gobustan, 60-70 km from Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan) mentions the presence of Legio XII Fulminata's centurio named Lucius Julius Maximus (1; 2).
The region’s strategic dimensions
For the
centuries, the superpowers like Roman and Persian Empires (3), Caliphate,
Persian and Byzantium Empires (4) or Ottoman, Persian and Russian Empires (5,
6) struggled to control the South Caucasus. Undoubtedly, since the time of
Great Silk Way, the South Caucasus plays an important role and is a shortest
land way from Chine to the Europe. The region is a land bridge between Black
Sea and Caspian Sea; and is a gateway to the Middle East and the Central Asia.
In this light, the South Caucasus has strategic geographical and transportation
dimensions.
In the era
of industrialization and the world’s economy dependency on oil and gas, the
South Caucasus has gained an additional strategic dimension – the energy
dimension - specifically for Azerbaijani hydrocarbons’ huge reserves and
production. Azerbaijan, in the beginning of XX century, has produced more than
half of the world oil production and 95% of Russian oil (11 million tones/per
year) (7). And, in nowadays, the South Caucasus is a region neighboring the
Persian Gulf. So, the South Caucasus has a multi-dimensional strategic
importance both for global and regional powers. Finally, the region’s strategic
significance has been brilliantly described by Dr Brzezinski (former National
Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter) in “The Grand Chessboard” (8).
South Caucasus politics' key
players The contemporary politics of the South Caucasus is characterized by the high level of complexity as well as dynamic rivalry between global, regional and local players. Concerning to the region’s landscape, one can emphasize that the United States, Islamic world and European countries present global powers; Russia, Turkey and Iran are key regional actors; and finally, as local actors, one can indicate Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. In addition, a huge pool of influenceable international organizations like OSCE, CIS, EU, NATO, OIC and religious and humanitarian organizations operate and shape politics in this part of the world. Meanwhile, the large family of multi-national oil corporations and companies like BP (UK), Amoco (USA), UNOCAL (USA), McDermott International (USA) and others have their own “pie” in the Caucasus tangle web of oil and politics.
Last, the XXI century’s South Caucasus, like a whole Great Caucasus region, continues to be complex and unassimilated by Russians and occupies a strategic importance for global politics, international security and energy security.
Iran, as mentioned above, is one of the key players in the South Caucasus. And, as within the whole course of history, Iran (Persia) continues to be in the list of powers which struggles for their interests and goals in this region. So, the modern Iran has wide and deep historical experience to play its own strategic game in this part of the world.
Key sources of Iran’s foreign policy
It is
necessary to emphasize Iran (Persia), within the whole course of history, was able
to conduct smart, precise and delicate, balanced and pragmatic foreign policy. So
as result of this successful approach, Iran continues to exist in the world map
and now is one of the powerful nations. Moreover, Iran is able to adapt
effective foreign and security policy that reflects the flowing strategic
environments of different historical periods. The centuries of Persian policy’s
experience and ability to implement the smart policy testify that Iran has
fundamental sources which shape the nation’s foreign policy. Concerning the
modern Islamic Republic of Iran, the scholars from the RAND Corporation
(California based research organization) emphasize that there are certain
characteristics of Iran which drive the country’s foreign and security policy
(9).
Since the creation
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as authors urge, there are two key factors -revolutionary
Islam and Persian nationalism- which continue to be strong sources for Iran’s
foreign policy. However, they argue that the revolutionary or ideological
element has been decline after more than 20 years since the Islamic revolution.
Such decline has been occurred for several unsuccessful attempts to export and spread
the Revolution’s ideas into other parts of the Islamic world, particularly, to
the Central Asia and South Caucasus. From other side, according the RAND, the
revolutionary ideas brought Iran to the confrontation with superpowers and put
the country to the isolation. So, as many scholars agree, ideas of revolution
are declined and, finally, pragmatic, economic and geopolitical factors are
raised as driven sources of the country’s foreign policy.
The RAND’s
experts consider ethnicity and communalism as the next source of Iran’s foreign
policy. They emphasize that some (Azeris, Kurds) ethnic minorities’ close ties
with neighbor states as well as the ethnic communities across the Iranian
border are a key source for the country’s foreign policy. And we agree with
this implication. The Azeris are Iran’s largest ethnic minority. The ethnic
composition is: Persians are 51% of the country’s population, Azeris 24%;
Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%,
other 1% (10). Some ethnic groups are concentrated mainly in border areas and
have ties with ethnic groups or states across the Iranian border like Kurds and
Azeris. The Azeris have close ties with the South Caucasian Republic of
Azerbaijan and Kurds with Kurdish communities in Iraq and Turkey. Moreover,
Iranian Azeris have experience to establish their own an independent state
(Southern Azerbaijan Democratic Republic) that emerged in 1945-46 with the
support of Soviets (11). Finally, the Azeris minority’s experience to build
their own independent state, as well as an existence of the independent
Republic of Azerbaijan and Tajikistan (Persian speaking Central Asian state)
have key policy-making implications for Iran’s foreign and security policy
towards the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
The next
fundamental source for Iran’s foreign policy is economics. Since the Islamic
Revolution of 1979, Iran faces significant problems to modernize national
economy and military. Now the both issues occupy a high priority of Tehran’s
agenda. Iran needs foreign investments and to diversificate the national
economy and ensure access to new technologies. However, the isolation of Iran
in global affairs, as result of US-Iranian tensions, creates a huge obstacle
for Tehran to deal with economic, military and technological modernization.
Meanwhile,
it is necessary to emphasize that the relations between Iran and the United
States dominate Iran’s foreign policy and drive and fuel the country’s behavior
on global and regional levels. Moreover, the key strategic issue for Iran’s
foreign policy is: to solve problems with the West (United States). So, from
our viewpoint, Iran conducts foreign policy exactly from the prism of relations
with the United States and the West. So, Iran deals with the South Caucasus via
an angle of Iran-USA and Iran-Europe relations.
The South Caucasus - is oil and gas rich region with a strategic location that creates brilliant prospects for local nations to be rich and prosperous. However, the Caucasus belongs to “the areas of greatest insecurity in today's world lie along an arc from the Balkans though the Middle East to Central Asia” (12). Unfortunately, the South Caucasus is an arena of hard struggle between global and regional powers for geopolitical influence and to control Caspian energy recourses, as well as energy transportation routes. And Iran engages into this rivalry.
It is well known that the main threat to Iran’s security and
territorial integrity, within the last three centuries, has come from the North
– from imperial Russia and later from the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the local
states of the South Caucasus - Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia – were emerged
after the disintegration of the USSR. And now these states form a “buffer zone”
between Iran and Russia (13). Iran clearly understands that an existence of
such buffer zone is vital for nation’s security because of strong Russian
imperialistic ambitions and Moscow’s nostalgia on Red Empire’s “glory” days.
So, Iran strongly supports the independence of all three states. From other
hand, the existence of South Caucasian countries creates new opportunities and
challenges for Iran’s foreign and security policy.
We consider that Tehran’s strategy toward the South Caucasus
originates from Iran’s specific position in global affairs, especially from
nation’s confrontational relations with the West (USA). Iran’s relations with
the USA, as a backbone of Tehran’s strategic foreign and security policy, drive
and rule Tehran’s behaviour in global and regional levels, including the South
Caucasus. Moreover, some scholars believe that the significant degree of the
US-Iranian confrontation is continuing in the South Caucasus as well (14).
It is well known, Iran tries to contain and minimize Western
pressure. So, in accordance with this strategy, Tehran actively cooperates with
Russia. Notwithstanding with the collapse of Soviet Empire, modern Russia
continues to consider itself as a global competitor to the USA (15). Russia is
a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council. And Tehran takes
these points into account and considers Moscow as a key supporter. The
cooperation between Iran and Russia is highly saturated and covers wide agenda:
science, technology, military and nuclear and other issues with multi-billion
dollar turnover.
Meanwhile, the strategic cooperation with Iran is beneficial
for Russia as well. Iran is a huge market for Russia’s military weapons and
nuclear technology exports. Since 2005, Russia has observer status at the
Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s
influence in the Islamic world is an effective tool to create and support
Russia’s friendly image in Muslim states. Moreover, by the cooperation with
Iran and the OIC, Russia tries to minimize Islamic pressure in Russia itself,
as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia. From other hand, as global
competitor to the USA, Russia tries (in accordance with the old Soviet
strategy) to challenge America’s global positions, particularly in the Islamic
world.Russia very painfully reacts to the U.S. and NATO “advance” into Kremlin’s “near abroad”, particularly to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia tries to weaken Western influence and presence in this part of the world, as well as to secure Caspian energy resources and energy transportation routes under Moscow’s control.
We can emphasize that Iran’s has similar strategic goals in
the South Caucasus. So, Iran’s South Caucasian strategy is oriented to support
Russia’s dominance in this part of the world. It is beneficial for Tehran to be
under Russian umbrella or shadow in this region (16, 17). Both Russia and Iran
strengthen their positions in the struggle for influence with the United States
which has proclaimed that the Caspian basin is strategically vital for
America’s national interests (18, 19). Moreover, the European Union
step-by-step strengthens its positions as well. In other words, the West
actively implements the set of strategic programs like - Silk Road Strategy,
Partnership for Peace, Eastern Partnership and others which are oriented to
project Western influence to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. These
programs are vital to increase the Western presence and redesign the
post-Soviet local order or minimize Russian influence and control. Therefore,
Russia needs to react and reflect challenges which can weak Russia’s
traditional dominance in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Finally, Russia needs
to have a strategic partner and Iran is very valuable.
It is necessary to note that Iran’s hostility with the
United States and Israel pushes Tehran to be close with Moscow. Moreover,
Russia tries to prolong Iran’s problems with the United States as long as
possible. In this case, Russia defocuses Washington’s strategic attention from
Russia itself and Russia’s “near abroad” and creates significant “headache” for
Washington’s decision-makers. It is logical that if Russia considers itself as
global competitor for US dominance, so Russian strategists believe that US-Iran
tension, as well as America’s problems in Iraq, North Korean issues and Afghan
war would weak the United States global dominance and superiority. Finally, the
continuation of the US-Iran hostility ensures Iran’s dependency from Moscow and
secures Tehran’s billion dollars flow to the Kremlin that is vital to modernize
the old-style Russian economy.
From our perspective, the development of Iran’s foreign
policy toward the South Caucasus demonstrates that Tehran abandoned ideological
(Islamic or Shia) considerations and adopted pragmatic (supports Russia’s
policy) and regional (develops state-to-state relations) approaches toward the
South Caucasus. Iran tries to expand its political-security and economic role
in the region. Some Iranian scholars believe that “regionalism” could be
beneficial approach in Iran’s foreign policy. They argue that a regional
approach will strengthen Iran’s national interest at the regional and
international levels and increase Iran’s capacity to deal with great and
regional powers (20). Undoubtedly, by the developing of bilateral relations
with the South Caucasus sates, Iran could significantly increase its
capabilities in the international scene.
In this light, Iran considers the South Caucasus as a
possible and good platform to cooperate with the West. And this is a key
strategic dimension of Iran’s foreign policy toward the South Caucasus. Iran
tries to participate in huge international projects (with Western
participation) to explore and transport Caspian energy resources. However, the
United States strongly opposes to any Iran’s participation like it was happen
with Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century”. The United States excludes any
possible cooperation with Tehran for its nuclear ambitions and precisely
monitors Iran’s behavior.Nevertheless, Iran develops economic cooperation with local countries and considers state-to-state relations as a valuable “tool” to increase political influence and strengthen strategic positions. In this light, the cooperation between Iran and Armenia (with Russia’s blessing) is an example of such strategy. Undoubtedly, Iran-Armenian cooperation has key implications for the South Caucasus and is an effective approach to contain Turkey’s influence, Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic alliance (21) and rising Azerbaijan’s economic and military power.
Obviously, an improvement of Turkey-Armenian relations will decrease Tehran-Moscow axis’ role and weak the axis’ significance for the region. Moreover, an elimination of Turkey-Armenian hostility will dramatically decrease or undermine Russian dominance in the South Caucasus. So, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation does not correlate to Russian (first) and Iranian (second) strategic interests. And indeed, this process is already deadlocked (22). Moreover, Iran tries to contain Turkey, as NATO’s key member and close US ally, in the Greater Middle East region (23) toward which Iran has its own strategic interests and political goals (20).
Notwithstanding Iran has wide historical heritage to deal
with the South Caucasus, however, Tehran’s capabilities are significantly
limited. Iran, unlike Turkey, is not so attractive for the South Caucasian
countries because of Tehran’s tensions with the USA. This is first and key
point. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia, unlike Armenia, consider the West (USA) as
a key source to secure their independence and counterbalance predominant Russia’s
power. Second, the Islamic nature of Tehran’s regime significantly limits the
political co-operation; and third point - Russia! The elimination of Iran-US
tensions or their any significant improvement does not correlate with Russia’s
long term interests.
Finally, the strategic approach of Iran’s foreign policy
toward the South Caucasus is more pragmatic than ideological or based on
ethnicity and is oriented to prevent any significant shifts which could
strengthen positions of the United States or European Union or NATO; support
Russian dominance; keep balance between local states.
Region’s political dynamics and Iran’s strategic priorities
Since the Soviet Union’s breakup, we identify two significant shifts in the geopolitical game of the South Caucasus. The first is: - Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” of 1995; and - second, the Russo-Georgian war that broke out in August 2008. From our viewpoint, the first shift led to the second and, so, the event’s consequence indicates that the Russo-Georgian war was unavoidable.
Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” has opened doors for
large scale Western penetration and investments not only into Azerbaijani oil
and gas sectors, but to the whole South Caucasian region. And investments
brought wide and active political engagement of the West into Caucasian
affairs. The United States, NATO, the European Union and Turkey began
step-by-step to strengthen their positions and gradually started to implement
several strategic programs like: Silk Road Strategy, Partnership for Pease,
Eastern Partnership and strengthening Turkic identity. These programs and the
set of initiatives like Caspian Guard (24) are oriented to establish
pro-Western security arrangements and ensure Western (US) interest and direct
control over Caspian energy resources and energy’s transportation routes. Since the Soviet Union’s breakup, we identify two significant shifts in the geopolitical game of the South Caucasus. The first is: - Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” of 1995; and - second, the Russo-Georgian war that broke out in August 2008. From our viewpoint, the first shift led to the second and, so, the event’s consequence indicates that the Russo-Georgian war was unavoidable.
Undoubtedly, Iran considers such initiatives as a direct
threat to its security. Moreover, Iran was the first (possibly with Russian
approval) who tried to overthrow the situation and stop Western “advance” into
the region in which Russia and Iran are traditional players and have
common strategic goals.
So, Iran’s reaction was very clear and aggressive like it
was happen in 2001 when Iranian warship forced a British Petroleum boat to
return to port or Iranian military aircrafts violated Azerbaijani air borders
and entered country’s air space (25). Moreover, only the diplomatic
intervention of Ankara and Washington prevented a full-scale war (26). These
events emphasize that Tehran was very angry for Azerbaijan and Georgian
pro-Western orientation and for rising influence of the United States in the
whole Caspian basin.
It is necessary to note that Russia, in that time, was
engaged to solve the unrest in Chechnya. And, possibly for Chechen issues,
Moscow or Tehran-Moscow axis was unable to stop or at list to slow down Western
“advance”.
Finally, within the next years, the West was able
significantly to increase its presence in the South Caucasus. Moreover, Georgia
directly and Azerbaijan indirectly began to speculate on future NATO
membership. It was a time of “good hope” for local states to solve their
security issues.
So, within the years after the “Contract of the Century”,
Russia gradually being forced to retreat from the South Caucasus and Central
Asia. And Moscow very painfully reacted for Western and Asian advances to these
regions. Some experts emphasize that: “... to counter this development, one of
Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances... ” (36). So, possibly that
the origin of the Russo-Georgian war, from our viewpoint, comes from this
strategy. And Moscow’s strategic goal were clear: to stop Russia’s retreat and
retake strategic initiative and ensure Russia’s interests. Unfortunately,
Georgia’s President Saakashvili’s miscalculations have provided an opportunity
to shift the balance of power and strengthen Moscow’s security posture in the
region.
Finally, we have second significant shift and new or current
the region’s security pattern that has been emerged as result of the
Russo-Georgian war. Russia, as result of the war, was able significantly to
strengthen its position and influence. Moreover, Russia demonstrated to global
and regional powers that the South Caucasus (like a whole CIS) is Russian “near
abroad” and Moscow has exclusive rights to use the force and manage the
situation in accordance with Russia’s interests. The war provided to Russia a
brilliant opportunity to retake strategic initiative and enforce Moscow's
strategic position in its immediate neighborhood. And now, Georgian and
Ukrainian movement toward NATO membership is abandoned from the agenda. Some
scholars directly emphasize: “Western actors have in practice been forced to
recognize Russia’s military dominance in the region and act only in areas
approved by Russia and within the limits set by Russia” (27).
As logical continuation of the current strategic
opportunity, Russia (two years later) extends the lease of military base in
Armenia through 2044 (28). This is next significant Russia’s step to utilitize
success after the war with Georgia and, so, to strengthen its positions in the
region.
Iran, which is against any Western military presence in the
region, did not express any statements against Russia’s extension to lease a
base. So, Tehran’s silence means an approval for such developments.
Meanwhile, Russia accelerates its role to negotiate the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (29). Obviously, Russia is capitalizing its
advantages, coming as result of Russo-Georgian war and tries to arrange
pro-Russian security order. Finally, we can state that now the pendulum is on
the Tehran-Moscow axis’ side.
However, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates and US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton last visits to the South Caucasus ensures the United
States engagement to the ongoing hard rivalry in this strategic part of the
world (30, 31).
Undoubtedly, Russia’s strong positions mean that neither the
USA nor NATO will able to deploy military bases in close vicinity of the
Iranian border. The continuation of Russian dominance, therefore, has a
strategic significance for Iran’s foreign and security policy and is beneficial
for both Tehran and Moscow because of their close strategic priorities in the
South Caucasus:
- Counter and reduce US influence;
- Opposes US, NATO and EU current and long-term objectives;
- Contain EU influence and oppose to EU’s strategic initiatives;
- Prevent the deployment of US or NATO military bases;
- Oppose Israeli cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan;
- Stop Georgian and Azerbaijani drift toward NATO/EU membership;
- Arrange security order in accordance with Iran’s (and Russia’s) strategic interests;
- Ensure control over Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes;
- Contain rising influence of Turkey and Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance;
- Prolong Turkey-Armenia hostility;
- Oppose to the long-term strategic cooperation in Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan triangle;
- Keep strategic balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia and so, contain Azerbaijan’s rise to regional power;
- Support Russia’s leading role in Caucasian and Caspian affairs and so, ensure current "status-quo"
Finally, it is beneficial for Iran to keep status-quo and
support Russian dominance. Iran, in this case, is able to ensure its paramount
strategic goal: to limit or decrease U.S. influence and, so, to prevent America’s
attempts to redesign the region’s political landscape and secure Washington’s
dominance.- Counter and reduce US influence;
- Opposes US, NATO and EU current and long-term objectives;
- Contain EU influence and oppose to EU’s strategic initiatives;
- Prevent the deployment of US or NATO military bases;
- Oppose Israeli cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan;
- Stop Georgian and Azerbaijani drift toward NATO/EU membership;
- Arrange security order in accordance with Iran’s (and Russia’s) strategic interests;
- Ensure control over Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes;
- Contain rising influence of Turkey and Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance;
- Prolong Turkey-Armenia hostility;
- Oppose to the long-term strategic cooperation in Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan triangle;
- Keep strategic balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia and so, contain Azerbaijan’s rise to regional power;
- Support Russia’s leading role in Caucasian and Caspian affairs and so, ensure current "status-quo"
Iran’s bilateral relations with local countries
It is necessary to note that bilateral relations with the South Caucasus sates are a priority line in Iran’s foreign policy to deal with border countries. The cooperation with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia is powerful tool to strengthen Iran’s influence and political significance for local and global actors. The bilateral relation’s expansion could partially compensate Iran’s limited capacity, originates from Tehran’s regime nature, to participate in huge international projects that are currently implemented in the South Caucasus and Caspian basin as well. Moreover, Iran considers state-to-state relations as an effective approach to keep strategic balance between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.
Within the last decade, Azerbaijan was able to increase its
political, economic and military mighty and now “the balance of power in the
region shifted in favour of Azerbaijan” (32). Moreover, some European scholars
argue to consider Azerbaijan as a key country in the region and call to focus
or recalibrate EU policy on Azerbaijan instead of Georgia (32). It is necessary to note that bilateral relations with the South Caucasus sates are a priority line in Iran’s foreign policy to deal with border countries. The cooperation with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia is powerful tool to strengthen Iran’s influence and political significance for local and global actors. The bilateral relation’s expansion could partially compensate Iran’s limited capacity, originates from Tehran’s regime nature, to participate in huge international projects that are currently implemented in the South Caucasus and Caspian basin as well. Moreover, Iran considers state-to-state relations as an effective approach to keep strategic balance between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.
Undoubtedly, Iran clearly understands Azerbaijan’s strategic importance and tries to keep “on track” the dialogue with Baku. Tehran significantly intensifies high-level contacts and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad several times paid official visits to Baku to discuss the region’s agenda.
Azerbaijan’s raising power and its long-term cooperation with the USA/EU and Israel is a great concern for Iran. Some experts argue that Iran prefers to see Azerbaijan remain involved in the conflict with Armenia. In this case, as scholars believe, Azerbaijan will be “unattractive for Iran’s Azerbaijanis and unable to allocate resources to stir-up “South Azerbaijan” (33). Iran supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, but provides large scale economic assistance to Armenia. Interestingly, Iran, as Shia state, implements so called “double track” policy toward the Republic of Azerbaijan (87% are Shi'a Moslems). Tehran, possibly, considers the “double track” policy as an effective approach to contain the Republic of Azerbaijan which is becoming a new regional power. Moreover, Iran’s decision-makers suppose that Azerbaijan’s involvement in the conflict with Armenia is effective to contain Turkey and Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic alliance that covers energy, transportation, economic, political and military issues.
Meantime, the prolongation of Turkish-Armenian hostility is
an important element in Tehran’s calculations to keep Ankara under pressure and
limit the projection of Turkish power on the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
From other side, the Turkish-Armenian hostility increases Tehran’s strategic
significance for Armenia and Russia.
Finally, Iran is capitalizing political and economic
advantages from the current deadlock situation in relations between
Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance and Armenia. The main economic benefits are: - to
keep Iran as a valuable exporter for Armenian market; and - vital
transportation route that links Armenia with Iran's Persian Gulf ports.
Meantime, political advantages are huge: - to counterbalance
Azerbaijan's alliance with Turkey; - to reorganize Tehran’s image and
facilitate a US-Iran rapprochement via Armenian Diaspora’s assistance. And this
point is a key strategic element for Tehran to keep relation with Erevan on
track.
Georgia, it is necessary to note that Iran kept silence at
the Russo-Georgia war of 2008. Some scholars consider that “behind Iran's
official silence is a combination of factors. These range from Iran's common
cause with Moscow against expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), interpreting this crisis as a major setback for NATO's "eastward
expansion" in light of the unabashed pro-West predilections of Tbilisi's
government, to Iran's sensitivity to Russia's national security concerns” (34).
Notwithstanding Iranian position in Georgia’s crisis, the Iran-Georgia
relations are now under fast development. So, according to Georgian Deputy
Foreign Minister, Nino Kalandadze: “Our relations have entered a new phase”.
And on the joint news conference in Tbilisi on 27 May 2010, the Iranian Foreign
Affairs Ministry’s Spokesman, Ramin Mehmanparast (with deputy minister’s rank)
added that Georgia and Iran intend to resume direct airline flights, cancel
visa requirements for travelers, open an Iranian consulate in Batumi. Moreover,
as he has mentioned, the Iranian side “unconditionally supports Georgia’s
territorial integrity” (35).
The same position Iran expresses on Azerbaijan territorial
integrity. Baku and Erevan feel some mistrust toward Tehran because of Iran has
huge Azeri population but supports Armenia. However, Tehran tried to mediate a
peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan (13). Finally, Iran is playing its own
game in a classic Persian style: to balance between rivals and secure its own
interests.
ConclusionsAs the world’s oil and gas dependency is rising, so the safe and regular energy supplies will continue to occupy a high priority in world powers’ strategic agenda. In this light, the export of Caspian energy, it is well-known, is an alternative to the Persian Gulf energy. Within the last 15 years, the West has invested billion dollars to explore, develop and transport Caspian energy bypass Russia, which tries to be only one hub to supply oil and gas from the post-Soviet area to the world market.
The Clinton administration and the George W.Bush
administration have launched several strategic programs and initiatives
oriented to project and secure Western presence and so, to ensure stable energy
supplies from the South Caucasus. Unfortunately, the Obama administration does
not pay significant attention to the South Caucasus. And the lack of
Washington’s attention is beneficial for Iran and Russia but dangerous for
America’s stakes in the region. The decline of Washington’s strategic attention
creates an opportunity for Tehran-Moscow axis gradually to push out the USA
from the region and regain a full control over Caspian resources.
The continuation of US-Iran tensions means that Iran will
continue to be oriented on Russia. And Iran will support Russia’s strategy to
keep region’s “frozen conflicts” active. Because, it is better to keep local
conflicts unresolved and wait for the further opportunity to establish finally
pro-Russian-Iranian order than to allow the United States to solve the
conflicts and create pro-Western security order.
From other hand, Tehran’s decision-makers clearly understand
that the insecurity in the South Caucasus threats to Iran. So, Iran will try to
escape any involvement into “frozen conflicts” and minimize or eliminate any
threat of conflicts in the Central Asia. The continuation of insecurity in the
South Caucasus could directly affect to Iran’s internal politics. Moreover, the
military operations in the close vicinity of Iranian borders represent a
serious threat to Iran’s security. If a new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia
will break out, so the behavior of huge Iran’s Azeri population will
unpredictable. In addition, it will unclear the possible reaction of Iran’s
Azeris regarding the current Tehran’s regime which could fall.
"We are very concerned about security in the Caucasus
region, it is a rather sensitive topic for Tehran, so we are ready to take part
in solving the problematic issues in the region," said Iranian Foreign
Minister Monuchehr Mottaki in Tbilisi at a joint press conference with Foreign
Minister of Georgia Grigol Vashadze (38).
However, we can see that Iran’s foreign policy toward the
South Caucasus has a strategic dilemma: to keep status quo and, so, to counter
Western influence; or to facilitate the settlement of conflicts and secure
peace and stability along Iranian borders.
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26-Fariz Ismailzade, The Geopolitics of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Centre for World Dialogue, GLOBAL DIALOGUE Volume 7, Number 3–4, Summer/Autumn 2005—The Volatile Caucasus, http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=354 ;
27-Krzysztof Strachota, cooperation with Wojciech Gorecki, The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the Russian-Georgian War – the geopolitical consequences, September 24, 2008, Center for eastern Studies, Poland, www.osw.waw.pl
28- Russia extends lease on military base in Armenia through 2044, RIA Novosti, 20 August 2010, http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160276128.html ;
29-Leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia discuss Nagorno-Karabakh settlement in Russia, 27 October 2010, RT-Russia Today TV Channel, http://rt.com/Politics/2010-10-27/azerbaijan-armenia-russia-karabakh.html ;
30- Clinton’s Caucasus Campaign Gains Tepid Results, July 5, 2010, Eurasianet.org, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61464
31- Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Congressional Research Service (CRS), September 16, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf ;
32-Stefan Meister, Recalibrating Germany’s and EU’s Policy in the South Caucasus, DGAP analyse, July 2010,N2, http://aussenpolitik.net/themen/eurasien/kaukasus/recalibrating_germany-s_and_eu-s_policy_in_the_south_caucasus ;
33-Brenda Shaffer, Iran’s Role in the South Caucasus and Caspian Basin: Diverging Views of the U.S. and Europe, Belfer Center, Harvard University, July 2003, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ ;
34-Kaveh Afrasiabi, Iran gambles over Georgia's crisis, August 16, 2010, Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JH16Ak01.html ;
35- Vladimir Socor, Georgia Develops Functional Relations With Iran, Georgian Daily, May 27, 2010, http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18724&Itemid=132
36-Marcel de Haas, Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus, January 06, 2007, Eurasianet.org; http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010707.shtml ;
37- Mina Muradova, Iran Seeks Role in Karabakh Settlement, March 18, 2010, John Hopkins University, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Analyst, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5291
38- Trend News Agency, November 11, 2010, FM: Iran stands ready to play 'significant role' in resolving conflicts in Caucasus, http://en.trend.az/print/1776791.html
6-Tyler Marshall, 'Caspian Sea: Oil in a Tinderbox', Kansas City Star, 8 March 1998, p. K-6
7-Baku Barons Day, Foreign Investments in Azerbaijan’s Oil, by Mir Yusif Mir-Babayev, Azerbaijan International, Summer 2004, Pages 82-85; http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai122_folder/122_articles/122_foreign_investment.html ;
8- Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (Basic Books: New York: 1997);
9-Fundamental Sources of Iranian Foreign and Security Policies, Chapter Two, RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1320/MR1320.ch2.pdf ;
10-CIA, The World Factbook, online edition, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html ;
11-The Southern Azerbaijan Question And Its Implications For Iranian National Identity, Alberto Priego, PhD Research Fellow University of London, SOAS, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, Biweekly, Vol II, N7, April o1, 2009, http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/vol2no7/20090406025632009.html ;
12-Philip Stephens, A political awakening that recasts the global landscape, The Financial Express, July 21, 2007, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com ;
13- Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, “Iran’s Role as Mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis,” Chapter VII of Contested Borders in the Caucasus, http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0701.htm
14-Sergey Makkedonov, The Caucasus Approaches of Iran: Main Priorities and Challenges, 01 June 2009, Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIES); www.rieas.gr
15- Dr. Subhash Kapila, Russia: The Inevitability of a new Cold War with the Unites States, South Asia Analysis Group, 26 August 2008, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers29%5Cpaper2822.html ;
16-Mier Javedanfar, Iran Foreign Policy Analysis – Iran’s alliance with Russia, implications of. 04 May, 2005; http://www.meepas.com/russiairanfpaanalysis.htm
17-Mahir Khalifa-zadeh, “Russian foreign policy toward New Independent States”, Journal of Republic, in Russian, Baku, September 23, 1992;
18-F.William Engdahl, The US's geopolitical nightmare, Asia Times, May 9, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE09Ad01.html
19-Dinara Kaliyeva, The Geopolitical Situation in The Caspian Region, UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS, Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation, http://revistas.ucm.es/cps/16962206/articulos/UNIS0404130011A.PDF
20-Dr Kayhan Barzegar, Regionalism in Iran’s Foreign Policy, 08 February, 2010, Iran Review, www.iranreview.org/content/view/5334/37/ ;
21-Vugar Masimoglu, Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic alliance treaty and Russia-Armenia military agreement: Status-quo in the South Caucasus remains unchanged –Analytics, APA News Agency, 20 August 2010, http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=128191
22-Armen Grigorian, Russian Hegemony and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution: A Quandary or an Impasse? Caucasus Edition Journal, October 01, 2010, www.caucasusedition.net
23- Ozan Örmeci, Caspian Weekly: Turkey's Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference, JDP Government and the Greater Middle East Project, May 29, 2010, Council on Foreign relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22373/caspian_weekly.html ;
24- Pyotr Goncharov, RIA NOVOSTI, 04/05/2005, US in Caspian Region and Russia’s Position, opinion & analysis, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050504/39817504.html?id=
25-Gulnara Ismailova, Azerbaijani Presidential’s visit to Iran Again Postponed, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Analyst, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/448 ;
26-Fariz Ismailzade, The Geopolitics of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Centre for World Dialogue, GLOBAL DIALOGUE Volume 7, Number 3–4, Summer/Autumn 2005—The Volatile Caucasus, http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=354 ;
27-Krzysztof Strachota, cooperation with Wojciech Gorecki, The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the Russian-Georgian War – the geopolitical consequences, September 24, 2008, Center for eastern Studies, Poland, www.osw.waw.pl
28- Russia extends lease on military base in Armenia through 2044, RIA Novosti, 20 August 2010, http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160276128.html ;
29-Leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia discuss Nagorno-Karabakh settlement in Russia, 27 October 2010, RT-Russia Today TV Channel, http://rt.com/Politics/2010-10-27/azerbaijan-armenia-russia-karabakh.html ;
30- Clinton’s Caucasus Campaign Gains Tepid Results, July 5, 2010, Eurasianet.org, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61464
31- Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Congressional Research Service (CRS), September 16, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf ;
32-Stefan Meister, Recalibrating Germany’s and EU’s Policy in the South Caucasus, DGAP analyse, July 2010,N2, http://aussenpolitik.net/themen/eurasien/kaukasus/recalibrating_germany-s_and_eu-s_policy_in_the_south_caucasus ;
33-Brenda Shaffer, Iran’s Role in the South Caucasus and Caspian Basin: Diverging Views of the U.S. and Europe, Belfer Center, Harvard University, July 2003, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ ;
34-Kaveh Afrasiabi, Iran gambles over Georgia's crisis, August 16, 2010, Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JH16Ak01.html ;
35- Vladimir Socor, Georgia Develops Functional Relations With Iran, Georgian Daily, May 27, 2010, http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18724&Itemid=132
36-Marcel de Haas, Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus, January 06, 2007, Eurasianet.org; http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010707.shtml ;
37- Mina Muradova, Iran Seeks Role in Karabakh Settlement, March 18, 2010, John Hopkins University, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Analyst, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5291
38- Trend News Agency, November 11, 2010, FM: Iran stands ready to play 'significant role' in resolving conflicts in Caucasus, http://en.trend.az/print/1776791.html
